Court References

Select from the menu below to view excerpts from over two hundred court references to The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada.

Appeal Courts

The following decisions refer to the various editions of The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada by Donald J. Lange, B.A., LL.B., Ph.D. (Cantab.)

ALBERTA COURT OF APPEAL

Black Diamond (Town) v. 1058671 Alberta Inc., [2015] A.J. No. 560 (C.A.) at par. 21 per the court:

[21] Dr. Lange, in his text, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, addressed the benchmark of a “judicial” decision:

It is no longer the law that for a decision to be judicial the actual hearing must give the litigant an opportunity for a full and fair hearing, that is, an opportunity to know the case and the opportunity to respond to it. This statement of the law originated in Rasanen v. Rosemount Instruments Ltd. and was adopted in many subsequent decisions. In Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., the Supreme Court of Canada expressly disapproved of this point of the decision in Rasanen and those decisions which applied the Rasanen proposition. For a decision to be judicial, the tribunal must only have the jurisdictional capacity to conduct a full and fair hearing.

Hnatiuk v. Assured Developments Ltd., [2012] A.J. No. 324 (C.A.) at par. 7 per the court:

[23] Cause of action estoppel requires that the same question now raised have been earlier decided, and have been fundamental to the earlier decision, not incidental. That law is well settled by high authority. See Lange, Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada 42-55 (3d ed 2010). The test for different causes of action is substance: facts substantially the same. It is not technical: id at 147-51.

. . .

[35] Abuse of process was also relied on by the trial judge. It is a more modern doctrine to be used where the precise grounds for res judicata are not quite made out. See Lange, op cit supra, Chap 4. We do not think that the res judicata issue is almost made out here. In particular, abuse of process requires that the same question have been litigated in both proceedings: Lange, op cit supra, pp 206-07. The questions were very different here. . .

. . .

[37] The defendant also assumes that a tribunal decision creates res judicata (or one of its relatives) as readily as does a court judgment. That is far from clear in Canadian law, and there are not very many cases about that. (Cf. Lange, op cit supra, at 176-77.) In any event, one thing is clear: the court has a discretion not to find or enforce res judicata flowing from a tribunal’s decision. That topic must be considered, and the judge cannot bypass it: see Lange, op cit supra, at 227-37. The chambers judge did not consider that issue here. . .

Ernst and Young Inc. v. Central Guaranty Trust Co., [2006] A.J. No. 1413 (C.A.) at par. 29, 37-38, 42 per the court:

[29] The doctrine of res judicata has two branches: issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. Issue estoppel precludes the litigation of an issue previously decided in another court proceeding, and cause of action estoppel precludes the litigation of a cause of action which was adjudged in a previous court proceeding: Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2d ed. (Ontario: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2004) at 1 [Res Judicata]. We need not consider the applicability of cause of action estoppel because issue estoppel precludes Central Guaranty from attacking the validity of the trusts in this litigation.

[37] The second precondition for issue estoppel is met if a decision is final in the sense that it determines the question between the parties conclusively. A decision is final if the court that made it “has no further jurisdiction to rehear the question or to vary or rescind the finding”: Res Judicata, supra at 85-86.

. . . .

[38] A decision need not determine the entire subject matter of the relevant litigation in order to meet the second precondition. Rather, the precondition is met where a decision finally disposes of a substantive right between the parties. Consequentially, “a final disposition in an interlocutory proceeding may give rise to issue estoppel in a different proceeding:” Res Judicata, supra at 86 and 182.

. . . .

[42] The special circumstances exception bars the application of issue estoppel in a second proceeding. In order to demonstrate special circumstances, a party must show that he or she exercised reasonable diligence in the first proceeding. The standard of reasonable diligence is an objective standard: Res Judicata, supra at 232-234.

Anderson v. Airsprint Inc., [2005] A.J. No. 1294 (C.A.) at par. 7 per the court:

[7] As stated by Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada at p. [187]:

In regard to striking an action, if the first action is struck out because it discloses no cause of action, a second action is not estopped if it discloses a cause of action.

One of the cases cited by Lange in support of the above statement is Bank of Nova Scotia v. Guenette (1986), 75 A.R. 361 wherein Master Funduk makes the following pointed observation . . .

Peters v. Remington, 2004 ABCA 5 at par. 12, 17 per Wittmann J.A. for the court:

[12] Determining if res judicata applies is a question of law: Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 12; Gibson Mining Co. v. Hartin, [1940] 2 D.L.R. 605 at 607 (B.C.C.A.). As a result, this Court must review the trial judge’s decision on a standard of correctness.

[17] In evaluating what was decided for the purpose of res judicata, the court may look to documentation beyond the formal judgment itself: Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada; Maynard v. Maynard, [1951] S.C.R. 346, [1951] 1 D.L.R. 241 at 251-52, leave to appeal to Privy Council denied, [1952] 1 S.C.R. vii; and Smode v. Deveaux (1996), 216 A.R. 20 at para. 3 (C.A.).

574095 Alberta Ltd. v. Hamilton Brothers Exploration Company, 2003 ABCA 34 at par. 36-38, 44, 50-52, 59 per Wittmann J.A. for the court:

[36] In Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (2000, Butterworths, Toronto, ON) the author notes at p.344 that “to seek to litigate an issue that is barred by cause of action estoppel or issue estoppel is an abuse of process”. See also Ho-A-Shoo v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000) 47 O. R. (3d) 115 (O.S.C.J.) at 125. The notice of motion brought by the appellants arguably contained two separate, though inter-related, grounds for ending the litigation.

[37] The first basis was that the common law principle of res judicata applied to prevent the law suit from proceeding because of the public policy ground that it is in the public interest that an end be put to litigation after a final decision has been rendered (Lange at p. 4). If the legal tests for either of the two branches, issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel, are met, then res judicata arises unless the court exercises a discretion to allow the matter to continue in the interest of justice and fairness: Lange p. 32; Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Ltd. [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460. On this basis, no discretion was applied in the present case since the chambers judge ruled that the tests for issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel were not made out. If the chambers judge applied the wrong legal test in coming to his conclusion that issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel did not apply then he made an error of law. The standard of review for an error of law is correctness.

[38] The second basis was that the litigation was a more general “abuse of process” and the amended statement of claim should be struck out pursuant to ARC 129(1)(d). This is far more of an exercise of discretion by the court since there are no clear legal tests, although if it can be shown that issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel apply then it is considered an abuse of process. For example, a court may rule that an abuse of process exists even when the legal tests for issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel are not made out. The standard of review for an exercise of discretion is reasonableness. Further, Lange notes at p. 346:

… Whether the doctrine of abuse of process by relitigation is applied with or without estoppel support, its invocation sounds a death knell to a successful appeal. Because the application of abuse of process by relitigation is an exercise in discretion, unlike the prevailing view of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel, it gives little room for an appellant to argue any ground of appeal other than that of an egregious error in the exercise of discretion.

Consequently, it is a very high standard to meet.

. . . . 

[44] This is clearly broader than the McIntosh concept that only those questions distinctly put into issue and directly answered in the earlier proceeding could form the basis of res judicata by issue estoppel. Dickson, J., for the majority in Angle, allowed that facts and conclusions of law that were not directly or explicitly put into issue could still have been necessarily determined if they were fundamental to the earlier decision. In a more recent analysis of res judicata, Lange stated at p. 42-43 that:

[For the same question test] the nature of the question includes what was “directly in question” and what was “necessarily presumed,” or to use the wording of Sutherland, J. from Re Agil Holdings Ltd. (1985) 32 A.C.W.S. (2d) 259 (Ont H.C.) at 61, what has been decided “expressly or by necessary implication.”

     What comprises the subject matter fundamental to the question is, therefore, a twofold investigation to determine the nature of the question. Firstly, it comprises the express question that was actually decided…. Secondly, it comprises the latent structure support in the express question by virtue of an implied, inferred, or assumed recognition of that structure.

. . . .

[50] Determining if a question has been necessarily answered by previous litigation is not simple since there is confusion over Dickson, J.’s prohibition in Angle of “inference by argument from the previous judgment”. As Lange notes at p.45:

The meaning of “inference by argument” has not been defined in Canada. It may be difficult to distinguish between “inference by argument,” which is not part of the same question test, and phrases such as “necessarily inferred,” “by necessary logical consequence,” and “by necessary implication,” which are part of the same question test.

[51] However, Angle at p.555 has given some guidance as to when an issue is necessarily determined in the previous litigation by the requirement that the question or issue must have been so fundamental to the previous decision that the substantive previous decision could not be made but for the determination of the question or issue.

[52] Whether an issue is fundamental to the prior decision may not only prevent an answer to a question that was directly answered but collateral or incidental to the decision from being the basis of res judicata by issue estoppel but also provides guidance when a question not directly asked may form the basis of res judicata: Lange at p. 40. A question or issue would only be fundamental to, and necessarily determined by, a prior decision if that decision could not stand unless the question or issue was decided in a particular way. As Binnie, J. stated in Danyluk at para. [54]:

A cause of action has traditionally been defined as comprising every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if disputed, in order to support his or her right to the judgment of the court: Poucher v. Wilkins (1915), 33 O.L.R. 125 (C.A.). Establishing each such fact (sometimes referred to as material facts) constitutes a precondition to success. It is apparent that different causes of action may have one or more material facts in common. In this case, for example, the existence of an employment contract is a material fact common to both the ESA proceeding and to the appellant’s wrongful dismissal claim in court. Issue estoppel simply means that once a material fact such as a valid employment contract is found to exist (or not to exist) by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, whether on the basis of evidence or admissions, the same issue cannot be relitigated in subsequent proceedings between the same parties. The estoppel, in other words, extends to the issues of fact, law, and mixed fact and law [page490] that are necessarily bound up with the determination of that “issue” in the prior proceeding.

. . . .

[59] The chambers judge correctly stated in the context of cause of action estoppel that “while a party may be required to put forth all of its defences, it is not required to join, by way of counterclaim, a separate and distinct cause of action – see Hall v. Hall (1958), 15 D.L.R. (2d) 633 (Alta. C.A.) and Greymac Properties Inc. v. Feldman (1990) 1 O.R. (3d) 686.” Lange states at p. 49 that “[a]n issue which was not raised in the first action as a defence is not barred in the second action when the second action is based upon a separate and distinct cause of action – Wentworth (County) v. Hamilton Radial Electric Railway (1917) 41 D.L.R. 199 (Ont. C.A.) at 204-206.”

Wolch v. Wilder, 2001 ABCA 310 at par. 14, per Berger J.A., Fruman  and Cote J.A. concurring, at par. 21:

[14] It follows that res judicata requires a prior adjudication to that now being sought, but it is the timing of the decision, not the timing of the commencement of the action, that is dispositive. See also ATL Industries Inc. v. Han Eol Ind. Co. (1995), 36 C.P.C. (3d) 288 (Ont. Gen. Div.). D.J. Lange, in his textbook The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 72-73, listed factors that are to be considered to determine if a legal entity is a privy:

having knowledge of the previous proceeding

a clear interest in the proceeding

the ability to intervene as a participant but choosing to stand-by and watch

active participation in the previous proceedings by giving evidence, and being part of the litigation team

different parties who act together to circumvent a previous decision

having the non-party’s counsel present at the earlier proceedings

being affected by the issue determined in the previous proceedings

410675 Alberta Ltd. v. Trail South Developments Inc., 2001 ABCA 274 at par. 14 per curiam:

[14] 410675 also relies on this court’s decisions in Pocklington Foods v. Provincial Treasurer (1995), 165 A.R. 155 (C.A.), and International Datashare Corporation v. Q.C. Data Petroleum Services Ltd. , [2000] A.J. No. 166 (C.A.), online: Q.L. (A.J.). Those cases do not deal with res judicata. They address the court’s power to prevent successive interlocutory applications, when the same or substantially the same relief has previously been sought and refused. This has been described as the power of the court to prevent abuse of its process by relitigation of interlocutory matters. The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, supra, at 363. The application before Gallant J. was not the relitigation of the same issue decided in the first action.

BRITISH COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEAL

H.Y. Louie Co. v. Bowick (c.o.b. Power Quest Batteries, [2015] B.C.J. No. 1163 (C.A.) at par. 27 per Newbury J.A.t:

[27] It seems obvious that issue estoppel does not arise here because of the requirement that the question to be decided in the second proceeding must be the same one as was decided in the first proceeding. (See Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (3rd ed., 2010) at 27.)

Moses v. Lower Nicola Indian Band, [2015] B.C.J. No. 241 (C.A.) at par. 49-50, 52 per Newbury J.A. for the court:

[49]If one assumes, then, that the consent order effectively directed that the parties were to bear their own costs, does it establish an estoppel against Mr. Moses’ claim for “damages” in tort in the amount of his legal fees? It appears that on the law as it now stands, a consent order may, like any other order of a court, give rise to issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel: see Donald Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (3rd ed., 2010) at 351-365. The more difficult question arises from the long-established rule that for issue estoppel to apply, the parties or their privies “should have claimed or defended in the same right in the former proceedings as they represent in the later ones.” (See Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed.), vol. 16, at para. 993; my emphasis.) This is the requirement of “mutuality” (which I note was abandoned in the U.S. some years ago).

[50] Lange notes that the mutuality requirement was firmly established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79 2003 SCC 63, which involved the relitigation of a criminal conviction in a union grievance proceeding. The Court reviewed the American jurisprudence on the topic but saw “no need to reverse or relax the long-standing application of the mutuality requirement in this case …”. It concluded that “appropriate guidance” was available in Canadian law with the doctrine of issue estoppel “without the modification to the mutuality requirement that this case would necessitate at.” (At para. 25). In Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. 2001 SCC 44, however, the Court intimated in obiter that the debate was not over. The Court declined to address the issue of the “same parties” test and the influence of American jurisprudence on the question of mutuality, noting that in the case before the Court, the parties were identical and “the outer limits of ‘mutuality’ and of the ‘same parties’ requirement need not be further addressed.” (At para. 60.)

. . .

[52]    It is impossible for us to answer these technical questions at this stage of the proceeding, especially without the benefit of whatever amendments are to be made to Mr. Moses’ pleadings. (In this regard, our position is similar to that of the Court in Canadian Shredded Wheat Co. Ltd. v. Kellogg Co. of Canada [1939] S.C.R. 329. There, similarly difficult and technical questions regarding the parties’ capacities were raised, leading the Court to conclude that the question was a “technical point to which effect ought not to be given in the circumstances.”) (See Lange, supra, at 80.) Nor is it possible at this stage to judge the likely success of an argument based on abuse of process, which normally involves “such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice.” (Toronto v. CUPE, supra, at para. 37.) I again decline, then, to strike out the claim for misfeasance, but would leave it open to the trial judge to do so with the benefit of the amended pleadings and evidence.

Reliable Mortgages Investment Corp. v. Chan, [2014] B.C.J. No. 92 (C.A.) at par. 23 per Willcock J.A.:

[23] The appellants rely upon the first five of the estoppel doctrines described in Donald Lange’s text, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada: Third Edition (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc. 2010) at p.11:

There are six essential doctrines developed by the courts of Canada. Each one of these doctrines may be applied with rigour based on its precise meaning. In their most concise definitions, the six essential estoppel doctrines are:

(1) Issue estoppel bars an issue which has actually been decided in the first proceeding.

(2) Issue estoppel under the rule in Henderson bars an issue which could have been brought in the first proceeding.

(3) Cause of action estoppel, the trust res judicata, bars a cause which has actually been decided in the first proceeding.

(4) Cause of action estoppel under the rule in Henderson bars a cause which could have been brought in the first proceeding.

(5) Abuse of process by relitigation bars a second proceeding when the integrity of the judicial decision-making process in the first proceeding will be undermined.

(6) Collateral attack bars a second proceeding when a party, bound by an order, seeks to avoid compliance with that order by challenging the order itself and its enforceability, not directly but indirectly in a separate forum.

With respect to the policy grounds, a consideration of issue estoppel or cause of action estoppel focuses upon the interests of the litigants. A consideration of abuse of process by relitigation or collateral attack focuses upon the justice system.

Erschbamer v. Wallster, [2013] B.C.J. No. 263 (C.A.) at par. 16 per Tysoe J.A., for the court:

[16]Although it is referred to as cause of action estoppel, the principle applies to defences as well as claims. This is explained in Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 3d ed. (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis, 2010) at 137-38:

While the plaintiff may not split a cause of action or pursue litigation by instalments, the defendant may not split the defence by turning around and, as the plaintiff in a subsequent action, sue on an issue which, if successful, would challenge the integrity of the previous judgment. This is what was attempted in Henderson.

* * *

 In other words, a cause of action in a second action which could have been a defence in the first action, but was not raised, is barred … The cloak of cause of action estoppel is woven the same for both the plaintiff and the defendant in subsequent proceedings.

[Footnotes omitted.]

Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. (Re), [2011] B.C.J. No. 677 (C.A.) at par. 27, 33 per Newbury J.A., for the court:

[27] Res judicata takes two forms in modern practice, cause of action estoppel (still sometimes called res judicata) and issue estoppel. Lange summarizes them as follows:

In their simplest definitions, issue estoppel means that a litigant is estopped because the issue has clearly been decided in the previous proceeding, and cause of action estoppel means that a litigant is estopped because the cause has passed into a matter adjudged in the previous proceeding. [At 1.]

[33] Lange (see 58-65 and the cases cited therein) suggests that an “extended form” of issue estoppel has been adopted in some provinces such that any question that could have been decided or could have been raised at the first proceeding, will be barred in the second. However, this approach has not received appellate approval in this province, and when it has been used, seems not to have led to a different result than the traditional approach. (See the discussion in Re Agil Holdings, supra, and in Lange at 62-3.) Neither party relied on the extended form of issue estoppel in the case at bar.

R. v. Punko, [2011] B.C.J. No. 199 (C.A.) at par. 71 per Kirkpatrick J.A., for the court:

[71] In contrast, Donald Lange, in The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 3d ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2010) at 374, states:

Unlike the special pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, there is no plea of issue estoppel. It is a defence. It is part of the general plea of not guilty and the common law defences protected by the Criminal Code. In other words, issue estoppel may not be raised in a criminal proceeding until a plea of not guilty has been entered.[Footnotes omitted.]

Susan Heyes Inc. (c.o.b. Hazel & Co.) v. Vancouver (City), [2010] B.C.J. No. 391 (C.A.) at par. 10 per Newbury J.A., for the court:

[10] There is no doubt that many of the same issues of fact and law will arise in Guatam as arose in Heyes. But res judicata, on either of its branches, applies only where the same issues arise in a previous proceeding as have been decided between the same parties or their privies. Thus Donald J. Lange in The Doctrine of Res Judicat in Canada (2nd. ed., 2004) offers this quotation from McIntosh v. Parent (1924) 55 O.L.R. 552 (C.A.), per Middleton J.A., as the classic definition of the doctrine:

When a question is litigated, the judgment of the Court is a final determination as between the parties and their privies. Any right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of recovery, or as an answer to a claim set up, cannot be retried in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies, though for a different cause of action. The right, question, or fact, once determined, must, as between them, be taken to be conclusively established so long as the judgment remains. [At 26-7; emphasis added.]

Azeri v. Esmati-Seifabad, [2009] B.C.J. No. 574 (C.A.) at par. 51 per Finch C.J.B.C., for the court:

[51] As well, it should be noted that, since the limitation period in relation to Mrs. Azeri’s children has not expired, and res judicata does not apply to a dismissal for want of prosecution, they are in a position to commence a new action in respect of their claims under the Family Compensation Act: see Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 187.

MacKinnon v. National Money Mart Co., [2009] B.C.J. No. 468 (C.A.) at par. 78, 80 per Newbury J.A., for the court:

[78] To similar effect, Donald J. Lange writes in The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (2nd ed., 2004) that the test of finality for issue estoppel should not be confused with finality for the purpose of cause of action estoppel. He continues:

The test for issue estoppel is a substantive issue test where the decision affects substantive rights of the parties in respect of a matter bearing upon the merits of the cause of action, as distinct from some collateral matter. This can be readily seen in decisions in interlocutory proceedings. A decision is final in nature because it finally disposes of a substantive right raised between the parties which may or may not be determinative of the entire action. [At 86; emphasis added.]

Lange also notes that although there is no estoppel where a court of appeal grants a new trial of an entire case without restriction, the same is not true where a court of appeal in granting a new trial decides a substantive question in the litigation. That question, he writes, is taken to have been conclusively determined between the parties for purposes of the litigation. (At 99; see also Western Canada Power Co. v. Bergklint (1916) 54 S.C.R. 285, at 299, per Duff J., as he then was.)

[80] Given, then, that the criteria for issue estoppel are met, the remaining question is whether this court should exercise its jurisdiction in the interests of justice to make an exception on the basis of “special circumstances”. This exception is used sparingly, but recognizes that estoppel is intended to serve the ends of justice, not defeat them: see Arnold v. National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 A.C. 93 (H.L.) at 109-111, per Lord Keith, quoted in Hockin v. Bank of British Columbia (1995) 123 D.L.R. (4th) 538 (B.C.C.A.) at 550. The onus lies on the party seeking the exercise of this discretion: see Lange, supra, at 234.

Roeder v. Lang Michener Lawrence & Shaw, [2007] B.C.J. No. 501 (C.A.) at par. 21 per Newbury J.A., for the court:

[21] Had counsel for Mr. Roeder not made the concession he did and continued to assert that there was a causal nexus between the allegedly improper disclosure of information to the Commission and its 1995 order, I would also have concluded that the appeal must be dismissed – on the basis of abuse of process by relitigation. This principle is a wider one than the rule against collateral attack, and is not subject to the complexities of that rule, or of res judicata or issue estoppel, although all four principles involve many of the same policies: see Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata (2000), at 343-52.

Dhillon v. Dhillon., [2006] B.C.J. No. 3008 (C.A.) at par. 7-8, 22, 30 per Thackray J.A., Finch C.J.B.C. concurring, Southin J.A. partially dissenting on other grounds:

[7] The appellants did not raise the form of the action in the case at bar, either in the trial court, or in this Court. However, the form in which the action was taken, that is an action referred to as “civil fraud”, caused problems at the trial and complicates this appeal. It might be expected that Mr. Dhillon would have brought an action specifically addressing the earlier judgment. Donald J. Lange, in The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, second edition, 2004, at page 250, states: “the common procedure to address the fraud of the first proceeding, and the estoppel effect of the judgment, is to set aside the [earlier] judgment itself.” If that had been done it would have been submitted that the default judgment was in error in that Mr. Dhillon had not been served with the process. Further, that the powers of attorney were forgeries and that the defendants were guilty of fraudulent acts.

. . . .

[8] However, what Lange suggests would be the common procedure to address the fraud of the first proceeding did not anticipate a situation such as in the case at bar. In the instant case the earlier judgment was not only 14 years earlier, but it was in favour of innocent plaintiffs.

. . . .

[22] Lange states, in The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada:

Pleading res judicata permits a litigant to argue that the earlier determination is conclusive evidence rather than merely prima facie evidence when not pleaded (at page 11).

The plea of res judicata must set out fully the facts which create the plea, not simply plead the first proceeding and the order. It must distinctly plead facts sufficient to show that the question raised in the second proceeding was absolutely adjudicated upon in the first proceeding (at page 12) [footnotes omitted].

The author notes that Gwynne J., for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in McMillan v. Davies (1892), reported in Edward Robert Cameron, Canada: Supreme Court Cases (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1905) 306 at 317, stated this requirement to be as follows:

… it would be necessary that the plea [of estoppel] should contain suitable averments of what was the precise matter in contestation in such interpleader issue and of what is the precise matter in contestation in the present action so as to raise for adjudication the question of estoppel relied upon by the defendant.

[30] Further, Lange states, in The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, at page 250 that: “[p]roving fraud in the first proceeding has always deprived a litigant of the estoppel effect of an entered judgment.” He goes on to say,that “[i]n Canada, fraud has been described as an exception [to res judicata] of special circumstances”, citing St. Denis v. North Himsworth (Township)(1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 482 at 491 (Div. Ct.), Johnston v. Barkley (1905), 10 O.L.R. 724 at 728-729 (C.A.), and Hamada v. Northguard Mortgage Corp. (1985), 67 B.C.L.R. 115 at 121 (S.C.) in support. (Reservations about Hamada were voiced by Mr. Justice Hardinge, sitting as a Local Judge of the Supreme Court, in Bank of B.C. v. Singh (1987), 17 B.C.L.R. (2d) 256.). Lange continues as follows:

A second proceeding, which relitigates the subject matter of the first proceeding founded on fraud, will be confronted with the estoppel effect of the first proceeding. To obviate this effect, the litigant may plead the special circumstances of fraud in order to relitigate the subject matter of the first proceeding.

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

Genpharm Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc., 2003 FCA 467 at par. 46 per Rothstein J.A. for the court:

[46] Third, this litigation has both public law and public interest aspects which require that consideration of the application of the issue estoppel doctrine not be limited to its impact on the private rights of the parties. There is some authority for the proposition that issue estoppel does not apply to public law litigation, notably by McKeown J. in Del Zotto v. Canada, [1994] 2 F.C. 640 at 644 (T.D). However, in my view, the public law nature of the litigation is simply one of the factors to be weighed in the exercise of the Court’s discretion. For further discussion, see Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000), at 248-254.

Apotex Inc. v. Merck & Co. Inc., 2002 FCA 210 at par. 27 per Malone J.A. for the court:

[27] In the words of Moir J.A. in Duhamel, supra, adopted by Lamer C.J. on appeal, “this contemplates that the prior decision could not have been obtained without the point in issue being resolved in favour of the party urging the estoppel” (Duhamel, supra, at 278 (C.A.)). In essence, this statement is merely an affirmation of the principles articulated by Dickson J. in Angle in 1974. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the issue must have been the main point or ratio decidendi of the first decision, but rather that resolution of the issue is an essential element of the logic or reasoning behind it (Iron v. Saskatchewan (Minister of Environment and Public Safety), [1993] 6 W.W.R. 1 at 11 (Sask. C.A.)). The decision which is said to give rise to the estoppel need not be a decision which determines the entire subject matter of the litigation. The test for issue estoppel is a substantive issue test where the decision affects substantive rights of the parties with respect to a matter bearing on the merits of the cause of action (see Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 78).

Nametco Holdings Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) 2002 FCA 474 at par. 8 per Strayer J.A. for the court:

[8] With respect to the arguments based on estoppel or res judicata, these doctrines can have no application where the first decision-maker had absolutely no jurisdiction to determine the issue it purported to decide. (See Angle v. MNR [1975] 2 SCR 248-257, Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] 2 SCR 460 at para. 51). Further, where the initial process was without any validity it cannot form the basis for alleged abuse of process. (See Rowett v. York Region Board of Education et al (1988), 63 OR (2d) 767, where it was held that abuse of process involves raising in a subsequent proceeding an issue that has previously been decided by a tribunal which had the jurisdiction to so decide). See also Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 90, 109, 358.

Krishnapillai v. Canada, 2001 FCA 378 at par. 9 per Decary J.A. for the court:

[9] For the doctrine of issue estoppel (as opposed to the doctrine of cause of action estoppel, which is not argued here) to apply, the same question must have been actually decided in the first proceeding. For the same question to have been actually decided in the first proceeding, it must be clear from the facts that the question has indeed been decided and the issue out of which the estoppel is said to arise must have been fundamental to the decision arrived at in the earlier proceeding. For the issue to have been fundamental to the earlier proceeding, there must be no doubt that the decision could not have been made without that issue being addressed and actually decided. There is no equivocal finding which can found issue estoppel. (See Angle v. M.N.R., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 248; The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, Donald J. Lange, Butterworths, 2000, at page 38 ff.)

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

Genpharm Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc., 2003 FCA 467 at par. 46 per Rothstein J.A. for the court:

[46] Third, this litigation has both public law and public interest aspects which require that consideration of the application of the issue estoppel doctrine not be limited to its impact on the private rights of the parties. There is some authority for the proposition that issue estoppel does not apply to public law litigation, notably by McKeown J. in Del Zotto v. Canada, [1994] 2 F.C. 640 at 644 (T.D). However, in my view, the public law nature of the litigation is simply one of the factors to be weighed in the exercise of the Court’s discretion. For further discussion, see Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000), at 248-254.

Apotex Inc. v. Merck & Co. Inc., 2002 FCA 210 at par. 27 per Malone J.A. for the court:

[27] In the words of Moir J.A. in Duhamel, supra, adopted by Lamer C.J. on appeal, “this contemplates that the prior decision could not have been obtained without the point in issue being resolved in favour of the party urging the estoppel” (Duhamel, supra, at 278 (C.A.)). In essence, this statement is merely an affirmation of the principles articulated by Dickson J. in Angle in 1974. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the issue must have been the main point or ratio decidendi of the first decision, but rather that resolution of the issue is an essential element of the logic or reasoning behind it (Iron v. Saskatchewan (Minister of Environment and Public Safety), [1993] 6 W.W.R. 1 at 11 (Sask. C.A.)). The decision which is said to give rise to the estoppel need not be a decision which determines the entire subject matter of the litigation. The test for issue estoppel is a substantive issue test where the decision affects substantive rights of the parties with respect to a matter bearing on the merits of the cause of action (see Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 78).

Nametco Holdings Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) 2002 FCA 474 at par. 8 per Strayer J.A. for the court:

[8] With respect to the arguments based on estoppel or res judicata, these doctrines can have no application where the first decision-maker had absolutely no jurisdiction to determine the issue it purported to decide. (See Angle v. MNR [1975] 2 SCR 248-257, Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. [2001] 2 SCR 460 at para. 51). Further, where the initial process was without any validity it cannot form the basis for alleged abuse of process. (See Rowett v. York Region Board of Education et al (1988), 63 OR (2d) 767, where it was held that abuse of process involves raising in a subsequent proceeding an issue that has previously been decided by a tribunal which had the jurisdiction to so decide). See also Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 90, 109, 358.

Krishnapillai v. Canada, 2001 FCA 378 at par. 9 per Decary J.A. for the court:

[9] For the doctrine of issue estoppel (as opposed to the doctrine of cause of action estoppel, which is not argued here) to apply, the same question must have been actually decided in the first proceeding. For the same question to have been actually decided in the first proceeding, it must be clear from the facts that the question has indeed been decided and the issue out of which the estoppel is said to arise must have been fundamental to the decision arrived at in the earlier proceeding. For the issue to have been fundamental to the earlier proceeding, there must be no doubt that the decision could not have been made without that issue being addressed and actually decided. There is no equivocal finding which can found issue estoppel. (See Angle v. M.N.R., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 248; The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, Donald J. Lange, Butterworths, 2000, at page 38 ff.)

MANITOBA COURT OF APPEAL

Loewen v. Manitoba Teachers’ Society, [2015] M.J. No. 21 (C.A.) at par. 28, 83 per Steel J.A. for the court:

[28] The doctrine of res judicata reflects the fundamental premise that there must, at some point, be an end to litigation. The broad concept was developed to deal with the problems of unfair relitigation, consistency of result and finality. See Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata In Canada, 3d ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2010) at 1; and R. v. Mahalingan, 2008 SCC 63 at paras. 14-16, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 316. It has been variably described as lying “at the heart of the administration of justice” (Toronto (City) at para. 15); as a “fundamental principle of our system of justice” (R. v. Van Rassel, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 225 at 238); and as “a cornerstone of the justice system in Canada” (Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2d ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2004) at 4).

. . .

[83] Lange (2010) addresses this issue, stating (at p. 95):

A decision that is final for the purpose of issue estoppel may be a decision that does not necessarily determine the entire subject matter of the litigation. The test of finality is not a cause of action test and should not be confused with a final decision for the purpose of cause of action estoppel where the entire cause of action, or subject matter, is merged in the decision. The test for issue estoppel is a substantive issue test where the decision affects substantive rights of the parties in respect of a matter bearing upon the merits of the cause of action, as distinct from some collateral matter. This can readily be seen in decisions in interlocutory proceedings. A decision is final in nature because it finally disposes of a substantive right raised between the parties which may or may not be determinative of the entire action.

. . .

[85] In order to determine whether the First Arbitrator’s decision was intended to be final, the Second Arbitrator should have considered the decision in context, including the nature of the administrative scheme, specific statutory and Plan provisions (see Lange (2010) at p. 119), the factual matrix in which the decision was made and the general legal principles applicable to the type of decision being made.

Anderson v. Manitoba, [2010] M.J. No. 375 (C.A.) at par. 51 per Hamilton J.A. for the court:

[51] Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 3d ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2010), makes this point succinctly (at p. 17): “The burden is on the party proving res judicata and determining it is a question of law.

Glenko Enterprises Ltd. v. Keller, [2008] M.J. No. 65 (C.A.) at par. 30, 31, 37, 38, 42, 50, 56 per Hamilton J.A. for the court:

[30] Res judicata has two distinct forms: issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. Donald J. Lange, in his leading text, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2d ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2004), explains the differences (at pp. 1-2):

… issue estoppel means that a litigant is estopped because the issue has clearly been decided in the previous proceeding, and cause of action estoppel means that a litigant is estopped because the cause has passed into a matter adjudged in the previous proceeding.

… The best early pronouncement of the meaning of res judicata by the Supreme Court of Canada is in the 1893 decision in Farwell v. R. [(1894), 22 S.C.R. 553 at 558]. King J. defined the general meaning, respectively, of both cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, stating:

Where the parties (themselves or privies) are the same, and the cause of action is the same, the estoppel extends to all matters which were, or might properly have been, brought into litigation. Where the parties (themselves or privies) are the same, but the cause of action is different, the estoppel is as to matters which, having been brought in issue, the finding upon them was material to the former decision.

[31] Later, he explains that the policy rationales underlying the doctrine of res judicata are twofold (at p. 4):

… The foundation of the doctrine is traditionally grounded upon two policy considerations: firstly, the ground of public policy that it is in the interest of the public that an end be put to litigation, and secondly, the ground of individual right that no one should be twice vexed by the same cause. …

[37] As just stated, cause of action estoppel demands a different analysis. In addition to the mutuality requirement, another fundamental principle is that a plaintiff should bring forward the subject matter of the whole case relating to the cause of action at one time. In other words, cause of action estoppel is somewhat similar to the doctrine of merger where, “… in the case of a former recovery, a second action is barred from seeking the relief which has previously granted” (see Lange, op.cit., at 129).

[38] For cause of action estoppel to apply, four requirements must be satisfied.

(1) there must be a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction in the prior action;

(2) the parties to the subsequent litigation must have been parties to or privies of the parties to the prior action (mutuality);

(3) the cause of action in the prior action must not be separate and distinct; and

(4) the basis of the cause of action and the subsequent action was argued or could have been argued in the prior action if the parties had exercised reasonable diligence.

See Lange at 125. See also Grandview v. Doering, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 621, and Bjarnarson (H.R.) v. Manitoba (1987), 48 Man.R. (2d) 149 (Q.B.), aff’d (1987), 50 Man.R. (2d) 178 (C.A.).

[42] As already explained, the requirement of mutuality demands that the same parties, or their privies, must be involved in both actions. In his text, Lange explained that “[p]rivity requires parallel interest in the merits of the proceeding, not simply a financial interest in the result” (at p. 77):

… Before a person can be a privy of a party, there must be community or privity of interest between them, or a unity of interest between them. They cannot be different in substance. Privity can be one of blood, title, or interest. A person who is privy in interest to a party in an action and has notice of that action is equally bound by the findings in that action. A privy is a person who has a right to participate with a party in the proceeding or who has a participatory interest in its outcome. … To determine whether a person has a participatory interest in the outcome of the proceeding is to determine whether the outcome could affect the liability of that person. Privity requires parallel interest in the merits of the proceeding, not simply a financial interest in the result.

[emphasis added]

[50] Here, there has been no suggestion that Keller was personally liable for the conduct of Keller Ltd. in the first action. Therefore, in my view, I do not see how he can now be declared a privy of Keller Ltd. for the purposes of barring the second action. Going back to the words of Lange, Keller is not a privy because he did not have “… a right to participate with a party in the proceeding or [have] a participatory interest in its outcome” (at p. 77). Although the outcome affected his financial interest as a shareholder, it did not create personal liability. He only had a financial interest in the result, not a “parallel interest in the merits.”

[56] Abuse of process is an extraordinary remedy. Lange wrote at 372:

… Like issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel, abuse of process by relitigation is an extraordinary remedy to be applied sparingly and only in the clearest and most obvious cases, but in recent times it is repeatedly applied, like issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel, without express reference to this conservative guideline. …

NEW BRUNSWICK COURT OF APPEAL

Sackville (Town) v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1188, [2007] N.B.J. No. 97 (C.A.) at par. 33 per Drapeau C.J.N.B. for the court:

[33] The principle – some label it a doctrine – of res judicata has two distinct forms: cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. Generally speaking, cause of action estoppel – or action estoppel as it is sometimes called – is concerned with preventing the re-litigation of a suit that has been adjudicated, while issue estoppel is directed at precluding the rehashing of an issue that has been settled in the course of a previous adjudication. Res judicata has been described as a rule of evidence (see Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1394 v. Extendicare Health Services Inc. et al. (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 65 (C.A.), [1993] O.J. No. 1545 (QL), per Doherty J.A.) and as a bar or defence to an action that must be specially pleaded (see Cooper and Smith v. Molsons Bank (1896), 26 S.C.R. 611 at 620, Cox v. Cox and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1987), 82 N.B.R. (2d) 379 (C.A.) at 382, [1987] N.B.J. No. 526 (QL) and Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2nd ed., (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2004) at p. 11). In either case, neither cause of action estoppel nor issue estoppel operates to oust a judicial tribunal’s jurisdiction over an action (see McNichol v. Co-Operators General Insurance Co. (2006), 298 N.B.R. (2d) 44 (C.A.), [2006] N.B.J. No. 194 (QL), 2006 NBCA 54, para. 23). Moreover, courts have reserved unto themselves a discretionary power to reject the application of res judicata in, admittedly, exceptional circumstances (see McNichol, at para. 23, and the cases cited therein, including Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc.).

[36] Res judicata, in either of those forms, is hardly a technicality. Indeed, it is commonly described as a “fundamental doctrine of the justice system” (see The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, at p.8), one that is founded on considerations of justice and good sense (see New Brunswick Rail. Co. v. British and French Trust Corporation, Ltd., [1939] A.C. 1, per Lord Maugham L.C. at pp. 19-20). . .

McNichol v. Co-operators General Insurance Co., [2006] N.B. No. 194 (C.A.) at par. 29 per Drapeau C.J.N.B. for the court:

[29] Canadian law on the subject has not strayed from the beaten path. It is explained in Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2004) at 211-12:

An action may be discontinued without a motion, as of right, under rules of civil procedure provided this is done before the close of pleadings. Such a discontinuance does not bar a second action because there has been no adjudication on the merits. The plaintiff is in the same position as if no action had been commenced. Rules of civil procedure may explicitly provide for this although such a provision is not necessary. The discontinuance of an action is not to be confused with the dismissal of an action. The latter creates an estoppel; the former does not.

Where a motion is required for leave to discontinue an action, an order granting leave without conditions will create no estoppel. A bare discontinuance is no bar, whereas a bare dismissal is a bar. Usually, the order for discontinuance will contain a condition that no further action may be taken. This condition bars a subsequent proceeding. In Re Woodhouse, 14 D.L.R. 285, the Ontario Court of Appeal reviewed the rules of civil procedure affecting discontinuance. Hodgins J.A., for the court, stated:

It is provided in Rule 430, clause 3, that a discontinuance under clause 1, i.e., before receipt of the statement of defence or after the receipt thereof and before any other proceeding in the action is taken by the plaintiff, shall not be a defence to any subsequent action. This means that by that sort of discontinuance there is not established any foundation for a plea of res judicata. But, where the plaintiff has to apply for leave, the Court or a Judge has power to direct that the order shall be a bar to any future action. This is exactly equivalent in effect to a judgment under such circumstances as entitle the defendant to allege that the matter in question has passed into judgment binding both parties. For if it is not a bar in that sense, it is no bar at all.

In Schlund v. Foster, [1908] O.J. No. 540, Riddell J. stated the principle from the defendant’s perspective, addressing the question of terms to be imposed against the plaintiff seeking to discontinue the action at a late stage in the action. Riddell J. stated:

[T]his action is carried on so far that the plaintiff is no longer dominus litis, but the defendant has acquired rights and is entitled to a judicial declaration as to merits between himself and the plaintiff; the plaintiff must submit to such a judicial declaration, unless he is released from such necessity by an order of the Court; he is now appealing to the Court to be released from such necessity and to be allowed to deprive the defendant of his right to such declarations; the defendant is not asking for any favours from the Court or from the plaintiff, but pursuing the regular course to have his rights determined.

Schlund was quoted with approval in Blum v. Blum. 47 D.L.R. (2d) 388, McLennan J.A., for the court, stated:

The principles stated in that case and the other considerations mentioned are matters which should be considered from the defendant’s standpoint by a Judge in exercising his discretion as to what are the “proper” terms, if any, to be imposed. Whether terms are imposed and what they are will depend upon the balancing of interests of the plaintiff in obtaining leave with the interests of the defendant.

New Brunswick (Executive Director of Assessment) v. Ganong Bros. Ltd., [2004] N.B.J. No. 219 (C.A.) at par. 49 per Roberston J.A. for the court:

[49] We begin with the legal proposition that “estoppel” does not apply in the context of annual property assessments. The law is conveniently summarized in D.J. Lange’s text, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 325:

In matters of property assessment, where a new assessment is made each year, the law is settled that a decision with respect to one year’s assessment does not estop an assessment made in the subsequent year. Each year is a new question. A new liability has arisen because it is a new year.[Footnotes omitted.]

Cote v. Desjardins, 2000 NBCA 52, par. 34, 37, 40 per Ryan J.A.:

[34] In Farwell v. R., [1893] 22 S.C.R. 553, at page 558, King, J., states:

      […] Lorsque les parties (elles-mêmes ou leurs ayants droit) sont les mêmes et que la cause d’action est la même, la préclusion s’étend à toute question qui a fait partie du litige ou aurait convenablement pu en faire partie. Lorsque les parties (elles-mêmes ou leurs ayants droit) sont les mêmes, mais que la cause d’action est différente, la préclusion porte sur les questions qui, ayant été soulevées, ont fait l’objet d’une conclusion substantielle quant à la décision antérieure. […]

See also Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 2000), at pages 1-4, 29 and 343-67.

. . . .

[37] Below, excerpted from the affidavits filed before the Court of Queen’s Bench in connection with the initial matter, are the evidentiary elements which trigger application of the principle of res judicata (see The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, supra, at pages 12-19).

. . . .

[40] Furthermore, the evidence could support the argument that, in view of the nature of the matter heard in 1995, the admissions and the evidence, the resulting decision is in rem. See The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, at pages 375-79.

NEWFOUNDLAND COURT OF APPEAL

John Doe (HGM #1) v. Roman Catholic Episcopal Corp. of St. John’s, [2013] N.J. No. 361 (C.A.) at par. 42, 81, 88, 179 per Green C.J.N.L. for the majority and per Welsh, J.A. dissenting:

[42] . . .If the facts relied on to support the cause of action in the prior proceeding constitute substantially the same facts supporting the cause of action in the current proceeding, the causes of action will be regarded as the same (i.e. not separate and distinct) for the purposes of cause of action estoppel, even though the actual relief sought in the two proceedings is not the same. See Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 3d ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2010), pp. 147-151 and cases there cited.

[81] I do not accept that Smith can be carried so far. It was dealing with a different situation (subsequent change in the law) that was not traditionally regarded as an established exception to the application of res judicata. In fact, there is some dispute on the authorities as to the extent to which a change in the law is a factor that would even, in principle, warrant a court not to apply res judicata. (See Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, pp. 257-265 and cases there cited.) The policy issues underlining whether this should be recognized as a potential exception are different.

[88] With respect to the second criterion, there is some disagreement in the case law as to how the significance of the evidence is described. In Doering, the phrase “entirely changes the aspect of the case” was used. In Varette v. Sainsbury, a case involving new evidence as a justification for ordering a new trial, the test was expressed as being “practically conclusive” (p. 76) or such as would “conclusively establish” the case (p. 77). Penford v. Taylor and Brophy v. Collins have also enunciated a “practically conclusive” standard. In Toronto, Arbour J. described the standard as “conclusively impeaches the original results.” The predominant descriptor of the test appears to be “practically conclusive.” See, Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, p. 287.

[179] In The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, third edition (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2010), Donald Lange reviews the question of fresh evidence as a special circumstance in the context of res judicata. In addition to reference to the decision in Town of Grandview which adopted the language, “a fact which entirely changes the aspect of the case”, the author points to Supreme Court of Canada authority using the “practically conclusive” test, at page 287:

The practically conclusive test in Varette [v. Sainsbury, [1928] S.C.R. 72, at page 76] was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dormuth v. Untereiner [[1964] S.C.R. 122]. Ritchie J. noted that the same test had been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Gootson v. R. [ [1948] 4 D.L.R. 33 (S.C.C.), at pages 34 to 35] from which a passage similar to Varette was quoted. In Dormuth, Ritchie J. further examined whether the word “conclusive” was “too strong a word to use in this context” and concluded that “the phrase ‘practically conclusive’ has been employed more than once in this court and I see no reason for departing from it.” Thus the Supreme Court of Canada has firmly established that the test for new evidence is a practically conclusive test.

Leyson Holdings Inc. v. Newfoundland and Labrador ( Department of Works, Services and Transportation (Accommodation and Realty Services Division)), [2008] N.J. No. 360 (C.A.) at par. 29 per Rowe J.A. for the court:

[29] I would note the following passage from Gough v. Newfoundland and Labrador, 2006 NLCA 3; reported at (2006), 253 Nfld. & P.E.I.R., leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 71. In para. 49, Wells, C.J.N.L., for the Court, quoted with approval Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto, Butterworths, 2000) at p. 361:

Abuse of process by relitigation applies to proceedings which would normally be governed by cause of action estoppel and to proceedings which do not meet the technicalities of that doctrine. As with cause of action estoppel, abuse of process by relitigation has sometimes been described as a rule against litigation by installment, or the rule in Henderson [(1843), 3 Hare 100]. To breach the rule in Henderson, even though the parties are not the same, is an abuse of process. In applying abuse of process by relitigation, the courts have taken a stern view of raising in new proceedings issues that ought reasonably to have been raised in earlier proceedings. A party is not entitled to relitigate a case because counsel failed to raise an argument which the party wanted to raise or relitigate an issue indirectly by “a cleverly camouflaged effort”.

Bussey v. Maher, [2006] N.J. No. 235 (C.A.) at par. 18 per Welsh, J.A. for the court:

[18] The reason for requiring both parties to make all the arguments on which they intend to rely, including those to be made in the alternative, is to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings. It is not sufficient for a party responding to an appeal to make submissions only on the issue on which the trial judge decided the claim. Failure of a respondent to address all issues on which the appeal may be decided not only puts that party at risk of losing the appeal, but also forecloses future consideration of the alternative issues which were raised in the court below, but not argued on appeal. (See: Lubrizol Corp. v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (C.A.) (1996), 197 N.R. 241; [1996] 3 F.C. 40 (FCA), at paragraph 16; Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2nd edition (Markham: Butterworths, 2004, at page 100.)

Gough v. Newfoundland and Labrador, [2006] N.J. No. 6 (C.A.) at par. 49 per Wells C.J.N.L. for the court:

[49] Those principles are conveniently explained in a recent Canadian text [See Note 7 below] dealing with the subject. The author, Donald Lange, did an exhaustive review of Canadian decisions over the last hundred or so years. At pages 347-348, he explains the policy underlying the principle. He writes:

A statement on the doctrine of abuse of process found in Fieldbloom v. Olympic Sport Togs Ltd.[(1954), 14 W.W.R. 26 (Man. C.A.)] reflects the balancing policy grounds of the estoppel doctrines. Both abuse of process by relitigation and estoppel provide a means of achieving justice between the parties in an adversarial system but, at the same time, carry with them the seeds of injustice in relation to parties litigating. Coyne J.A. stated:

The court has an inherent power and duty to protect itself, and its processes and proceedings, in order to preserve and further the proper and due administration of justice, and that power and that duty is apart from and above any Rules made under The Queen’s Bench Act. The power is not, however, to be exercised without careful consideration and remembering not only that injustice must not be done to the party applying nor abuse of the process of the court permitted, but also that injustice must not be done to the other party. The power is a discretionary one, to be exercised on legal principles.

The policy supporting abuse of process by relitigation is the same as the essential policy grounds of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. The two policy grounds, namely, that there be an end to litigation and that no one should be twice vexed by the same cause, have been cited as policies in the application of abuse of process by relitigation. Other policy grounds have also been cited namely, to preserve the courts’ and litigants’ resources, to uphold the integrity of the legal system in order to avoid inconsistent results, and to protect the principle of finality so crucial to the proper administration of justice.

And, at page 361, he comments:

Abuse of process by relitigation applies to proceedings which would normally be governed by cause of action estoppel and to proceedings which do not meet the technicalities of that doctrine. As with cause of action estoppel, abuse of process by relitigation has sometimes been described as a rule against litigation by instalment, or the rule in Henderson [(1843), 3 Hare 100]. To breach the rule in Henderson, even though the parties are not the same, is an abuse of process. In applying abuse of process by relitigation, the courts have taken a stern view of raising in new proceedings issues that ought reasonably to have been raised in earlier proceedings. A party is not entitled to relitigate a case because counsel failed to raise an argument which the party wanted to raise or relitigate an issue indirectly by “a cleverly camouflaged effort”.

Note 7: Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000), at 343 et seq.

Furlong v. Avalon Bookeeping Services Ltd., [2004] N.J. No. 276 (C.A.) at par. 1 per Roberts J.A. for the court:

[1] This appeal [See Note 1 below] is all about the application of the doctrine of res judicata, described by Donald J. Lange in The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada as “a cornerstone of the justice system in Canada”. [See Note 2 below] Both of the doctrine’s two distinct forms, issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel, were applied by the chambers judge to allow the respondent Shannon Furlong (Ms. Furlong) to continue an action for the assessment of damages in the Supreme Court when the appellants’ liability for the motor vehicle accident which caused those damages was determined by an earlier action in the Provincial Court.

Note 1: Leave to appeal was required; however, at the beginning of the hearing it was conceded that the issues raised were significant ones and leave was immediately granted.

Note 2: Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000), at p. 4.

NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL

Quadrangle Holdings Ltd. v. Coady, [2015] N.S.J. No. 47 (C.A.) at par. 42, 49, 52 per Bryson J.A. for the court:

[42] On the other hand, res judicata is a rule of evidence (Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 3rd ed., (Markham: LexisNexis), 2009 at page 1284, and Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 3rd ed., (Markham: LexisNexis), 2010 at pages 12-13.) Lange argues that if res judicata is not pleaded it should not be raised as a ground on appeal, (page 15).

. . .

[49] For its part, Quadrangle cites Wolfe v. Pickar, 2011 ONCA 347, for the proposition that a foreign judgment is not res judicata if it has not pronounced on the merits of the case. Arguably decisions registered under the ECJDA enjoy greater protection than this. Nevertheless, relying upon Vancouver Island Helicopters v. Robertshaw Controls Co. (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 283 (H.C.) at 287, Lange provides that, “The dismissal of an action in one province on the basis of the expiry of the limitation period is not a dismissal on the merits and does not bar another action in another province with a longer limitation period.” [Emphasis added]

. . .

[52] As Lange notes, there is “overwhelming authority, old and new, that the court may look to the documentation behind the formal judgment to determine what was decided for the purpose of res judicata” (Lange, pp. 17-18). . .

Nova Scotia Public Service Long Term Disability Plan Trust Fund v. Wright, [2006] N.S.J. No. 336 (C.A.) at par. 42 per Cromwell J.A. for the court:

[42] Turning to the second point first, I am not persuaded that the judge erred in considering the material he did in his attempt to determine what the appeal board had actually decided. In making that determination, ” … the court may look to the documentation behind the formal judgment to determine what was decided for the purpose of res judicata. It is the substance of the matter actually decided which should control whether res judicata applies, not the form of the judgment.”: Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2nd ed., (Ontario: Butterworths, 2004) at pp. 14-15.

Lienaux v. 230107 Nova Scotia Ltd., [2005] N.S.J. No. 247 (C.A.) at par. 15, 31 per Roscoe J.A.:

[15] More will be said about the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to the amendments sought by the appellants in the following section of this decision. However, once more, in my view, a reasonably informed person would not suspect a judge of partiality on the basis of his application of an established legal doctrine, such as res judicata which has been referred to as “a cornerstone of the justice system” to the facts of this case. (see: The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, Donald J. Lange, Butterworths, 2000, page 4) Here there is nothing remotely similar to the facts giving rise to the finding of bias in the Pinochet case. Whether the legal principle was properly applied is an arguable issue to raise on appeal, but it does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. This ground of appeal should be dismissed.

[32] Finality is discussed by Lange, supra, at page 77:

The decision must be a final decision. A final decision for the purposes of issue estoppel is a decision which conclusively determines the question between the parties. …

The test for finality for issue estoppel, therefore, is that a decision is final when the decision-making forum pronouncing it has no further jurisdiction to rehear the question or to vary or rescind the finding.

[39] More specific to the Canadian approach to the issue of who is a privy to a party is the discussion in the Lange text, supra, at page 71:

For the purpose of issue estoppel, a privy of a party has been variously defined. Before a person can be a privy of a party, there must be community or privity of interest between them, or a unity of interest between them. They cannot be different in substance. Privity can be one of blood, or title, or interest. A person who is privy in interest to a party in an action and has notice of that action is equally bound by the findings in that action. A privy is a person who has a right to participate with a party in the proceeding or who has a participatory interest in its outcome. To determine whether a person has a participatory interest in the outcome of the proceeding, is to determine whether the outcome could affect the liability of that person. A non-party in an earlier proceeding is a privy on the basis of being involved in the first proceeding by being present and by giving evidence. The term “parties” includes those who are named in the proceeding and those who have an opportunity to attend the proceeding.

When there is a finding that a privy of a party is estopped by issue estoppel, the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation has, on occasion, also been applied to that person. Factors which have been considered in applying estoppel by conduct or representation are similar to factors which have been considered to establish a privy of a party, namely, having knowledge of the previous proceeding, a clear interest in the proceeding, the ability to intervene as a participant but choosing to stand-by and watch, active participation in the previous proceedings by giving evidence, and being part of the litigation team.

. . . .

The courts of Canada have made many findings of where a non-party is a privy of a party, and where a non-party is not a privy of a party for the purpose of issue estoppel. The following list comprises situations where a non-party is a privy of the party:

a director and officer of a company and the company (Ontario v. National Hard Chrome Plating Co., [1996] O.J. No. 93, (1995), 60 A.C.W.S. (3d) 289 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 11.)

the individuals who own or control a company and the company (420093 B.C. Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1995), 34 Alta. L.R. (3d) 269 (C.A.) at 277-79; Stelmaschuk v. Dean, [1995] 9 W.W.R. 131 (N.W.T.S.C.) at 143; Veroli Investment Ltd. v. Liaukus, [1998] O.J. No. 2535, (1998), 80 A.C.W.S. (3d) 338 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 8.)

a lawyer who is a director, officer, and solicitor for a company and the company (Guay v. Dennehy, [1994] 5 W.W.R. 738 (Man. Q.B.) at 747.)

a bank’s solicitor and the bank (Beaulieu v. McLaughlin, (1986), 68 N.B.R. (2d) 444 (C..A.) at 446-47.)

a wife and a husband (Quiamco v. Gaspar (1985), 33 A.C.W.S. (2d) 442 (B.C.C.A.) at 15-16)

an assignee of a mortgage and the mortgagee (Income Trust Co. v. Thatcher, [1991] O.J. No. 1037, (1991), 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 882 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 16. … reversed on appeal, [1995] O.J. No. 3571, (1994), 48 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1012) on the ground that the previous decision was not final …)

a person conducting a defence on behalf of a defendant and the defendant (DeChamplain v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 428 aff’d (1982), 40 O.R. (2d) 480 (C.A.)

Copage v. Annapolis Valley Band, [2004] N.S.J. No. 480 (C.A.) (Q.L.) at par. 52 per Fischaud J.A. for the court:

[52] …I am of the view that the discretion should not be exercised to permit Mr. Toney to claim wrongful dismissal again in the Nova Scotia law suit. I would, however, add a condition to the order that, if the adjudicator’s award is set aside on judicial review, then the stay of Mr. Toney’s claim be lifted: Municipal Contracting Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (2003), 212 N.S.R. (2d) 36 (C.A.) at paras. 13, 40; Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Butterworths, 2000) at p. 143.

Hache v. Lunenburg County District School Board, [2004] N.S.J. No. 120 (C.A.) at par. 51 per Cromwell J.A. for the court:

[51] In determining that the doctrine of abuse of process was the preferred approach to improper relitigation, Arbour, J. also referred to The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, Donald J. Lange, (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at pp. 347-48:

The two policy grounds, namely, that there be an end to litigation and that no one should be twice vexed by the same cause, have been cited as policies in the application of abuse of process by relitigation. Other policy grounds have also been cited, namely, to preserve the courts’ and the litigants’ resources, to uphold the integrity of the legal system in order to avoid inconsistent results, and to protect the principle of finality so crucial to the proper administration of justice.

NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL

Quadrangle Holdings Ltd. v. Coady, [2015] N.S.J. No. 47 (C.A.) at par. 42, 49, 52 per Bryson J.A. for the court:

[42] On the other hand, res judicata is a rule of evidence (Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 3rd ed., (Markham: LexisNexis), 2009 at page 1284, and Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 3rd ed., (Markham: LexisNexis), 2010 at pages 12-13.) Lange argues that if res judicata is not pleaded it should not be raised as a ground on appeal, (page 15).

. . .

[49] For its part, Quadrangle cites Wolfe v. Pickar, 2011 ONCA 347, for the proposition that a foreign judgment is not res judicata if it has not pronounced on the merits of the case. Arguably decisions registered under the ECJDA enjoy greater protection than this. Nevertheless, relying upon Vancouver Island Helicopters v. Robertshaw Controls Co. (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 283 (H.C.) at 287, Lange provides that, “The dismissal of an action in one province on the basis of the expiry of the limitation period is not a dismissal on the merits and does not bar another action in another province with a longer limitation period.” [Emphasis added]

. . .

[52] As Lange notes, there is “overwhelming authority, old and new, that the court may look to the documentation behind the formal judgment to determine what was decided for the purpose of res judicata” (Lange, pp. 17-18). . .

Nova Scotia Public Service Long Term Disability Plan Trust Fund v. Wright, [2006] N.S.J. No. 336 (C.A.) at par. 42 per Cromwell J.A. for the court:

[42] Turning to the second point first, I am not persuaded that the judge erred in considering the material he did in his attempt to determine what the appeal board had actually decided. In making that determination, ” … the court may look to the documentation behind the formal judgment to determine what was decided for the purpose of res judicata. It is the substance of the matter actually decided which should control whether res judicata applies, not the form of the judgment.”: Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2nd ed., (Ontario: Butterworths, 2004) at pp. 14-15.

Lienaux v. 230107 Nova Scotia Ltd., [2005] N.S.J. No. 247 (C.A.) at par. 15, 31 per Roscoe J.A.:

[15] More will be said about the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to the amendments sought by the appellants in the following section of this decision. However, once more, in my view, a reasonably informed person would not suspect a judge of partiality on the basis of his application of an established legal doctrine, such as res judicata which has been referred to as “a cornerstone of the justice system” to the facts of this case. (see: The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, Donald J. Lange, Butterworths, 2000, page 4) Here there is nothing remotely similar to the facts giving rise to the finding of bias in the Pinochet case. Whether the legal principle was properly applied is an arguable issue to raise on appeal, but it does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. This ground of appeal should be dismissed.

[32] Finality is discussed by Lange, supra, at page 77:

The decision must be a final decision. A final decision for the purposes of issue estoppel is a decision which conclusively determines the question between the parties. …

The test for finality for issue estoppel, therefore, is that a decision is final when the decision-making forum pronouncing it has no further jurisdiction to rehear the question or to vary or rescind the finding.

[39] More specific to the Canadian approach to the issue of who is a privy to a party is the discussion in the Lange text, supra, at page 71:

For the purpose of issue estoppel, a privy of a party has been variously defined. Before a person can be a privy of a party, there must be community or privity of interest between them, or a unity of interest between them. They cannot be different in substance. Privity can be one of blood, or title, or interest. A person who is privy in interest to a party in an action and has notice of that action is equally bound by the findings in that action. A privy is a person who has a right to participate with a party in the proceeding or who has a participatory interest in its outcome. To determine whether a person has a participatory interest in the outcome of the proceeding, is to determine whether the outcome could affect the liability of that person. A non-party in an earlier proceeding is a privy on the basis of being involved in the first proceeding by being present and by giving evidence. The term “parties” includes those who are named in the proceeding and those who have an opportunity to attend the proceeding.

When there is a finding that a privy of a party is estopped by issue estoppel, the doctrine of estoppel by conduct or representation has, on occasion, also been applied to that person. Factors which have been considered in applying estoppel by conduct or representation are similar to factors which have been considered to establish a privy of a party, namely, having knowledge of the previous proceeding, a clear interest in the proceeding, the ability to intervene as a participant but choosing to stand-by and watch, active participation in the previous proceedings by giving evidence, and being part of the litigation team.

. . . .

The courts of Canada have made many findings of where a non-party is a privy of a party, and where a non-party is not a privy of a party for the purpose of issue estoppel. The following list comprises situations where a non-party is a privy of the party:

a director and officer of a company and the company (Ontario v. National Hard Chrome Plating Co., [1996] O.J. No. 93, (1995), 60 A.C.W.S. (3d) 289 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 11.)

the individuals who own or control a company and the company (420093 B.C. Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1995), 34 Alta. L.R. (3d) 269 (C.A.) at 277-79; Stelmaschuk v. Dean, [1995] 9 W.W.R. 131 (N.W.T.S.C.) at 143; Veroli Investment Ltd. v. Liaukus, [1998] O.J. No. 2535, (1998), 80 A.C.W.S. (3d) 338 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 8.)

a lawyer who is a director, officer, and solicitor for a company and the company (Guay v. Dennehy, [1994] 5 W.W.R. 738 (Man. Q.B.) at 747.)

a bank’s solicitor and the bank (Beaulieu v. McLaughlin, (1986), 68 N.B.R. (2d) 444 (C..A.) at 446-47.)

a wife and a husband (Quiamco v. Gaspar (1985), 33 A.C.W.S. (2d) 442 (B.C.C.A.) at 15-16)

an assignee of a mortgage and the mortgagee (Income Trust Co. v. Thatcher, [1991] O.J. No. 1037, (1991), 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 882 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 16. … reversed on appeal, [1995] O.J. No. 3571, (1994), 48 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1012) on the ground that the previous decision was not final …)

a person conducting a defence on behalf of a defendant and the defendant (DeChamplain v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 428 aff’d (1982), 40 O.R. (2d) 480 (C.A.)

Copage v. Annapolis Valley Band, [2004] N.S.J. No. 480 (C.A.) (Q.L.) at par. 52 per Fischaud J.A. for the court:

[52] …I am of the view that the discretion should not be exercised to permit Mr. Toney to claim wrongful dismissal again in the Nova Scotia law suit. I would, however, add a condition to the order that, if the adjudicator’s award is set aside on judicial review, then the stay of Mr. Toney’s claim be lifted: Municipal Contracting Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (2003), 212 N.S.R. (2d) 36 (C.A.) at paras. 13, 40; Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Butterworths, 2000) at p. 143.

Hache v. Lunenburg County District School Board, [2004] N.S.J. No. 120 (C.A.) at par. 51 per Cromwell J.A. for the court:

[51] In determining that the doctrine of abuse of process was the preferred approach to improper relitigation, Arbour, J. also referred to The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, Donald J. Lange, (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at pp. 347-48:

The two policy grounds, namely, that there be an end to litigation and that no one should be twice vexed by the same cause, have been cited as policies in the application of abuse of process by relitigation. Other policy grounds have also been cited, namely, to preserve the courts’ and the litigants’ resources, to uphold the integrity of the legal system in order to avoid inconsistent results, and to protect the principle of finality so crucial to the proper administration of justice.

ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL

EnderNorth Industries Inc. (Re), [2009] O.J. No. 2815 (C.A.) at par. 61 per Blair J.A. for the court:

[61] I do not accept this argument. While there is little authority directly on point, I am satisfied that Ms. Hall, Mr. Cassina, and the appellant group of creditors are all “privies” of EnerNorth for the purposes of the s. 135 hearing analysis. As officers of EnerNorth, Ms. Hall and Mr. Cassina were clearly aligned with its interests in the Singapore proceedings, and in the present context continue to be so. It is clear that directors and officers may be considered the privies of their companies: see, for example, Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2d ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2004), at p. 79, citing Bank of Montreal v. Maple City Ford Sales (1986) Ltd. (2001), 51 O.R. (3d) 523 (S.C.). In the latter case, Gillese J. (as she then was) noted that to the extent that the former directors and a creditor of the bankrupt “come to this court to advance the claims of [the bankrupt] they are a privy” (p. 525).

Niagara North Condominium Corp.  No. 125 v. Waddintgon, [2007] O.J. No. 936 (C.A.) at par. 22 per Armstrong J.A. for the court:

[22] Arbour J. in the City of Toronto also cited, with approval at para. 38, D.J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (2000) at pp. 347-48 in support of the policy grounds which underlie abuse of process in these circumstances:

The two policy grounds, namely, that there be an end to litigation and that no one should be twice vexed by the same cause, have been cited as policies in the application of abuse of process by relitigation. Other policy grounds have also been cited, namely, to preserve the courts’ and the litigants’ resources, to uphold the integrity of the legal system in order to avoid inconsistent results, and to protect the principle of finality so crucial to the proper administration of justice.

Franco v. White, 2001 ONCA C34114 at par. 29, 40, 42 per Sharpe J.A. for the court:

[29] Canadian law has tended to distinguish between the “offensive” and “defensive” use of criminal convictions. Where the conviction is used offensively by the plaintiff to establish the defendant’s liability, as in the present case, the conviction is treated as prima facie proof, subject to rebuttal. It is where the conviction is raised defensively to resist a claim by the convicted party, as in Hunter and Demeter, that the courts have exercised their discretion to invoke the abuse of process doctrine to preclude relitigation. The distinction between offensive and defensive use of prior convictions has been mentioned frequently in the case law and is expressed as a “doctrine” by Lange The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 400.

. . . .

[40] The mutuality rule prevails in Canada: Lange supra, at pp. 58-63.

. . . .

[42] A similarly ambivalent approach is reflected by the manner in which the prima facie evidence standard is applied. As I will explain below, the effect given to convictions on motions for summary judgment borders on issue estoppel. Donald Lange, supra at p. 399, describes a kind of sliding scale approach to the weight attached to prima facie evidence:

In Canada, the doctrine that applies to the admissibility of a conviction in a civil proceeding is that the conviction is prima facie evidence. Prima facie evidence is the starting-point. Behind the doctrine is the probative value, or weight, to be given to the prima facie evidence in the civil proceeding. In some circumstances, the prima facie evidence will be persuasive evidence of the criminal finding. In other circumstances, the prima facie evidence will be conclusive evidence of the criminal finding. As the prima facie evidence transforms itself into weighty probative evidence in a civil proceeding, the doctrine of prima facie evidence, in essence, transforms itself into an application of the doctrines of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel.

City of Toronto v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79, 2001 ONCA C35112, at par. 48, 95 per Doherty J.A. for the court:

[48] I also do not agree that the rule against collateral attack on orders of superior courts provides a free-standing basis upon which to preclude relitigation. Not all collateral challenges are offensive: R. v. Consolidated Mayburn Mines Ltd. (1998), 123 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.); Braithwaite v. Nova Scotia Public Service Long Term Disability Plan Trust Fund (1999), 176 N.S.R. (2d) 173 (C.A.); and D. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, (Butterworths, 2000) at pp. 369-374.

. . . .

[95] The balancing of finality concerns with the individual litigant’s claim to access to justice is best seen in recent res judicata jurisprudence. This court has held that the traditional criteria set out in the res judicata doctrine provide the starting point for an analysis of any claim that a prior determination precludes relitigation. If those criteria are met, relitigation will be foreclosed in the vast majority of cases. However, even where the criteria are met, a court or tribunal may refuse in exceptional circumstances to apply the doctrine and may permit relitigation where the circumstances dictate that finality interests should yield to the justice of the individual case: Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., supra, at paras. 62-67 (S.C.C.); Minott, supra; Schweneke v. Ontario, supra; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Bear Island Foundation et al. (1999), 126 O.A.C. 385 at 392-93 (C.A.); D.J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, (Butterworths, 2000) at pp. 31-34.

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND COURT OF APPEAL

D.L.J. v. D.L.J., [2009] P.E.I.J. No. 9 (C.A.) at par. 22 per Jenkins C.J. P.E.I., for the court:

[22] I understand the appellant’s concern that issue estoppel might operate to preclude him from raising the issue again in the same proceeding, on the basis that it is a matter that was finally decided on the motion, and should have been appealed within the appropriate time frame. See: Lange, Donald J., B.A., LL.B., Ph.D.: The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2nd Edition, (LexisNexis Butterworths 2004), at pp.83-84; Diamond v. Western Realty Co., [1924] S.C.R. 308, at pp. 315-316; Fidelitas Shipping Co. v. V/O Exportchleb, [1925] 2 All E.R. 4 (C.A.). But in my opinion, issue estoppel would not apply in this situation. The proceeding was commenced by a statement of claim. The motions under consideration were always interim, both by definition and in nature. This is expressed in the respondent’s Notice of Motion, and confirmed in the exchange between the motions judge and counsel following the reasons for judgment and in the heading in the Amended Order for Interim Relief. I accept counsel’s submission that the interim nature of the relief could be clarified if the judgment expressed that the relief is not final, and is interim until trial, or that the ruling does not preclude the issue from trial or prejudge the trial of the issue, at which time a different order may be made.

QUEBEC COURT OF APPEAL

Ungava Mineral Exploration Inc. c. Mullan, [2008] J. Q. No. 160 (C.A.) at par. 92 per the court:

[92] Sans qu’il y ait lieu de s’en remettre à la common law sur ce point, on notera que le développement jurisprudentiel consacré par l’arrêt Srougi s’apparente par certains aspects à la notion de “privity” propre à l’exception de res judicata dans les autres provinces canadiennes65.

65 Voir par exemple: Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2nd ed., Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis/Butterworths, 2004, p.

SASKATCHEWAN COURT OF APPEAL

Dawgs Canada Distribution Ltd. v. Smith, [2013] S. J. No. 377 (C.A.) at par. 12 per Caldwell J.A. for the court:

[12] The first precondition for the application of issue estoppel is the requirement that the issue in the respondent’s first application be the same as in the second. In his seminal treatise, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto, Ont: Lexis Nexis, 2010), Dr. Donald J. Lange succinctly states (at p. 304): “Issue estoppel applies to foil an attempt to relitigate the same question in another motion in the same proceeding.” In negative terms, if the issue or question currently before the court is different or distinguishable from that which was previously before the court, the doctrine of issue estoppel does not apply. With respect to interlocutory or interim matters, Dr. Lange maintains (at p. 308):

Issue estoppel applies to interlocutory decisions which finally determine an issue in the absence of an appeal, material change in circumstances, or new evidence which has been previously suppressed or unavailable but the issue in the second motion must be the precise issue adjudicated upon in the first motion“. [Emphasis added.]

Gilewich v. Strand, [2007] S. J. No. 160 (C.A. in Chambers) at par. 7 per Hunter J.A.:

[7] The doctrine of abuse of process is explained in The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada [See Note 5 below] by Donald Lange. In Gough v. Newfoundland and Labrador [See Note 6 below] the Court noted that the abuse of process by relitigation is sometimes described at p. 361 as:

… a rule against litigation by instalment … In applying abuse of process by relitigation, the courts have taken a stern view of raising in new proceedings issues that ought reasonably to have been raised in earlier proceedings. …

Note 5: Donald J. Lange, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Canada, 2d ed. (Markham: Butterworths, 2004).